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Abstract
The South African old-age social pension has been much studied by both researchers and
policy makers, in part for the larger lessons that might be learned about behavioral responses
to cash transfers in developing countries. In this paper, we quantify the labor supply responses
of prime-aged individuals to changes in the presence of old-age pensioners in their households,
using longitudinal data recently collected in northern KwaZulu-Natal. Our ability to compare
households and individuals before and after pension receipt, and pension loss, allows us to
control for a host of unobservable household and individual characteristics that may determine
labor market behavior. We ￿nd that large cash transfers to elderly South Africans lead to
increased employment among prime-aged members of their households. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, pension receipt in￿ uences where this employment takes place. We ￿nd large, signi￿cant
e⁄ects on labor migration among prime-aged members upon pension arrival. The pension￿ s
impact is attributable both to the increase in household resources it represents, which can be
used to stake migrants until they become self-su¢ cient, and to the presence of pensioners who
can care for small children, which allows prime-aged adults to look for work elsewhere.
JEL Codes O12, H31, J20
1 Introduction
The South African old-age social pension has been much studied by both researchers and policy
makers, in part for the larger lessons that might be learned about behavioral responses to cash
transfers in developing countries. A non-contributory pension, the social pension pays more than
twice median per capita African (Black) income and represents an important source of income for a
third of all African households in the country. For the vast majority of South African women aged
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160 and above, and men aged 65 and above, the social pension provides a generous means of support
in old age. In principle the social pension is means tested, and the amount received should depend
on the recipient￿ s other income, but in practice it pays the maximum each month (currently 820
Rands) to women and men who reach pension age without access to private pensions. (See Case
and Deaton 1998 for details.) Africans often live in three or four generation households, so that
the social pension (which we will refer to as ￿ the pension￿ ) has the potential of reaching many poor
children and prime aged adults.
Because the pension relies on age-eligibility, researchers can largely eliminate changes in personal
behavior, undertaken to create eligibility, from the list of potential behavioral responses, when
evaluating its impact. Relatedly, because pension eligibility for the African community is very
well predicted by age-eligibility, we can use age-eligibility to de￿ne treatment status, allowing us
to sidestep issues of selection into treatment. The pension is also generous enough to have the
potential of changing behaviors in important ways.
In this paper, we will focus on whether and to what extent this large, stable source of income
leads to change in the labor force attachment of the prime-aged adults in households containing
pensioners. If households pool income, we might expect prime aged adults who share resources
with pensioners to reduce their work hours, or choose not to participate in the labor market,
when pension receipt begins. Alternatively, if social transfers allow households to overcome credit
constraints, enabling households to bankroll potential migrants or potential work seekers who need
￿nancial support to look for jobs, then social transfers like the pension may promote employment
and help households to break out of poverty traps. It is an empirical question whether, and to what
extent, resources channeled into households, in the form of the pension, change the labor market
behavior of household members.
To date, evidence on labor supply responses to pension receipt in South Africa has largely
relied on careful analysis of cross sectional data. Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller (2003), using
nationally representative cross-sectional data, ￿nd that prime-aged adults living in three generation
households with pensioners have signi￿cantly lower rates of labor force participation than do those
in three generation households without a pensioner. They conclude that ￿the pension dramatically
reduces the labor supply of the prime-age members of the household.￿Using the same data, Posel,
Fairburn and Lund (2006) argue that the labor supply e⁄ects are more nuanced: households with
pensioners may be observed with lower labor force participation among resident prime-aged mem-
bers, but these households are signi￿cantly more likely to have members who have migrated either
to work or to look for work. These authors argue that this e⁄ect may be due to credit constraints,
or to the need potential migrants have for an adult to be at home to care for children left behind
￿a role that could be played by pensioners.
In this paper, we identify individual labor supply responses to the Social Pension using lon-
gitudinal data recently collected in northern KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). Beginning in January 2000,
the Africa Centre for Health and Population Studies has followed members of approximately 11,000
households in the Umkhanyakude District of KZN. Because the survey has been carried out in multi-
ple waves, we can examine changes in employment and migrant status between waves, given changes
in household pension status. We examine the e⁄ect of household pension receipt, and pension loss,
on labor force participation for all prime-aged adult members of households in the Demographic
Surveillance Area (DSA). The longitudinal nature of these data allows us to use the timing of events
￿pension receipt, migration, labor force participation ￿to estimate causal pathways. Our ability
to compare households and individuals before and after pension receipt, and pension loss, allows us
to control for a host of unobservable household and individual characteristics that may determine
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When we estimate labor supply e⁄ects using only cross-sectional data from the household so-
cioeconomic survey, we replicate many of the ￿ndings from the earlier cross-sectional analyses.
Similar to Bertrand et al, we ￿nd a negative and signi￿cant relationship between the presence of
a pensioner in the household and employment among prime-aged adults who are co-resident with
the pensioner. As did these earlier authors, we ￿nd this result is driven by prime-aged men living
with pensioners being less likely to be employed. Similar to Posel et al, we ￿nd prime-aged adults
are signi￿cantly more likely to be labor migrants (that is, residing outside the DSA and reported
to be working) when their households in DSA include a resident adult age-eligible for the pension.
Like these authors, we ￿nd this e⁄ect is larger for women than for men, although in our data the
associations are positive and signi￿cant for both.
When we turn to longitudinal analysis, we ￿nd a small positive increase in the employment
of prime-aged adults once pension receipt begins in their households. The larger e⁄ects, however,
regard where that employment takes place. Prime-aged adults are signi￿cantly more likely to be
labor migrants after pension receipt begins in the household. On the ￿ ip side, we ￿nd individuals
in households that lose pension eligibility between rounds of the survey are signi￿cantly less likely
to be labor migrants once the pension is lost.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents details on the Africa Centre Demographic
Information System (ACDIS), with which we will evaluate the behavioral response to the pension.
Section 3 demonstrates that our results match those found in earlier cross-sectional analysis. Section
4 presents descriptive results in which we map the changes in employment and labor migration that
we observe in households before and after pension receipt, and before and after the withdrawal
of the pension. Section 5 presents a model of migration decision-making that can explain our
descriptive ￿ndings, and evidence that our results are due both to resource constraints, and to the
needs of households that must care for young children. Section 6 tests extensions and alternative
explanations for our ￿ndings, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Africa Centre Demographic Information System -
(ACDIS)
We evaluate individual and household behavioral responses to the pension using data collected on
approximately 100,000 people being followed by ACDIS. The surveillance site, part of one of the
poorest districts in KwaZulu-Natal, lies approximately 2.5 hours north of Durban. The ￿eld site
contains both a well-established township and a rural area administered by a tribal authority.
Demographic data on individuals and households in the surveillance area are collected twice
annually, and information on births, deaths, changes in marital status, and migration is updated
at each round. To re￿ ect the complexity of living arrangements in South Africa, data collection
here allows individuals to be members of multiple households ￿a man may have multiple wives,
each in a separate household, for example, or a woman may be recognized as a member of both
her mother￿ s and her sister￿ s households (see Hosegood and Tim￿us 2005; Hosegood, Benzler and
Solarsh 2005). As noted by Posel et al, in a country in which migrant work is a dominant feature
of the labor market, it is essential to understand the behavior of both resident and non-resident
household members. The ACDIS data allow us to do so.
During the ￿rst ￿ve years of demographic surveillance, two rounds of socioeconomic data were
collected, ￿rst in 2001 and then in 2003/04. We refer to the ￿rst round of Household Socio-Economic
3data collected as HSE1, and the second round as HSE2. We will use these data to measure changes
in labor force participation upon pension receipt. In all that follows, we will refer to households as
￿receiving a pension￿if they report having a member, resident in the household, who is age-eligible
for the pension. This allows us to sidestep issues of selection associated with a handful of elderly
persons who worked for ￿rms that maintain a private pension for them.
Table 1 presents relevant characteristics of individuals and households in the Demographic
Surveillance Area (DSA) at the time of the second socioeconomic survey, for households that existed
in both periods.
As is true for South Africa as a whole, one-third of households in the DSA report a person of
pension age at HSE2. Twenty-nine percent reported receiving a pension at both HSE1 and HSE2, 5
percent became pension households between rounds of the socioeconomic survey, and 4 percent lost
pension status. (As a shorthand, we will refer to individuals who are members of households that
became pensioner households between HSE1 and HSE2 as having ￿gained pension status￿between
waves of the survey, and those who had housed pensioners at HSE1 but not at HSE2 as having
￿lost pension status.￿ )
Households can gain a pension because someone of pension age joins the household as a resident
member, or because someone already resident becomes age-eligible between waves of the survey.
The latter represents the great majority (80 percent) of cases in which households in the DSA
gained a pension between HSE1 and HSE2. Households can lose pension status either because a
pensioner leaves the household or dies. In 77 percent of cases in which prime-aged adults￿households
lost pension status, this occurred because a pensioner died; in 11 percent of the cases, it occurred
because the pensioner left the demographic surveillance area (coded as ￿external individual out-
migration￿ ); and in 9 percent of cases it occurred because the pensioner left the household, but not
the surveillance area (￿internal individual migration￿ ).
Households with pensioners at HSE2 (columns 2 and 4) are signi￿cantly larger than those
that never had a pensioner and, on average, they report a signi￿cantly greater number of resident
members. This by itself is not remarkable: in order to have a pension, the household must have
at least one resident member of pension age. What is more noteworthy is that pension households
contain a signi￿cantly greater number of young children (ages 0 to 5) and older children (ages 6
to 17) than do households that never had a pension. Pensioner households at HSE2 also report
a greater number of prime-aged members who are working migrants. Households that were never
observed with a pension are wealthier, measured by the number of assets owned by the household.
These results ￿on relative household size, living arrangements of children, and lower socioeconomic
status among pension households ￿are consistent with data for the country as a whole (see Case
and Deaton 1998, and Edmonds et al. 2005).
Our focus will be on the behavior of prime-aged adults, which we de￿ne as men and women
greater than age 17 at HSE1 and less than age 51 at HSE2. Characteristics for these individuals
are presented in the bottom panel of Table 1. There is little di⁄erence between individuals who are
members of households that do not have a resident member age-eligible for a pension in either period
(column 1) and other prime-aged adults in terms of their ages and levels of education. However,
prime-aged adults who live in households that had pensions in both periods are signi￿cantly less
likely to be female (51 versus 55 percent). Both waves of the HSE asked whether every adult in
the household did ￿anything to earn money.￿The household respondent is prompted to remember
both formal and informal employment. There is a signi￿cantly greater employment reported for
individuals living in households that never had a pension (48 percent versus 45 percent for those
in households that always had a pension). In contrast, we ￿nd prime aged members of pension
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prime-aged adults in households that always had a resident pensioner, compared with 23 percent
in households that never did). Adults in households that gained a pension between the rounds of
the survey are the most likely to report being labor migrants (33 percent).
In summary, households with pensioners tend to be larger and poorer on average than those
that do not contain pensioners. They contain a signi￿cantly greater number of resident minors and
a signi￿cantly larger numbers of non-resident working members.
3 Cross-sectional patterns of employment and migration
Age patterns of employment and migration can be seen in Figure 1, which presents results separately
for men and women, resident and non-resident, who were ages 18 to 50 at HSE2. The probability
of being employed increases from something close to zero for men and women at age 18 to ap-
proximately 65 percent for men, and 55 percent for women, in their mid-thirties. Labor migration,
again de￿ned as working and being non-resident in the DSA, also increases with age: by their late
twenties, approximately 40 percent of men are reported to be labor migrants, and approximately
20 percent of women. After age 30, labor migration rates for women begin to decline, so that by
their late forties only 10 percent of women are reported to be labor migrants. In what follows,
we include polynomials in age when estimating employment and migration regressions that do not
include individual ￿xed e⁄ects. These age variables adequately capture the patterns observed in
Figure 1.
We examine the education pattern in employment and migration in Figure 2, where we
plot, for each level of completed education, the fraction of men and women who are reported to be
working or working migrants. Of special interest here is the role high school graduation (matric)
plays in employment. (This is marked in Figure 2 using a vertical line at grade 12.) Adults who
have more than a high school degree are the most likely to be employed. Those who have fallen just
short of a high school degree are the least likely to be employed. Because the pattern is not linear
in years of completed schooling, nor adequately captured by an indicator of having completed a
certain grade, we include a complete set of indicator variables for years of completed schooling in
our cross-sectional analysis.
Our results are based on the regressions of the following form:
.,
oo
iht ht iht iht y P X o em b ge = + +=
(1)
For individual i in household h observed in survey wave t ,our focus is on two labor market
outcomes: employment ( ye=1 if working, and =0 otherwise), and labor migrant status (ym =1 if
non-resident in the DSA and reported working, =0 otherwise). These are modeled as a function
of the presence of a resident household member age-eligible for the pension (Pht if a pensioner is
resident, =0 otherwise). We also include in equation (1) a set of household and individual level
controls X that we believe independently a⁄ect employment and labor migration status. These
controls will vary, depending on whether we are estimating equation (1) in the cross-section, or in
the panel (where we can control for individual-level ￿xed e⁄ects).
Throughout our analysis, the coe¢ cient of interest will be ￿. If the presence of a pensioner
is associated with a lower probability of employment among prime-aged household members, for
example, we would expect ￿ to be negative and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
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pensioner and employment and migration at HSE2 in Table 2. Each coe¢ cient presented is an
estimate of ￿ from a di⁄erent regression. Employment results are presented in the ￿rst two rows for
resident members (row 1) and all members (row 2). Labor migration results are presented in the
last row, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual is non-resident in the DSA and
is working. The ￿rst column of the table presents results in which the e⁄ect of being a member of
a pension household is estimated jointly for men and women. The second column presents results
for women estimated separately, and the last column reports results for men alone. All regressions
include the number of resident members in four age categories: ages 0 to 5, 6 to 17, 18 to 50 and
above age 50. In addition, all regressions include a quartic in age, indicators for years of completed
schooling, and (in column one) an indicator for sex. We allow for correlation in the unobservables
of individuals who are members of the same household.
Estimates presented in row 1 are closest in spirit to those presented by Bertrand et al.
Similar to their results, we ￿nd, when restricting the sample to resident members only, that the
presence of a resident pensioner is associated with a three percentage point lower probability that
a prime-age member is working. That this result is being driven by prime-aged resident men being
less likely to be employed can be seen by comparing results in the second and third columns of
Table 2. For women, the association is very small (￿ 0.009) and not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
In contrast, holding all else constant, we ￿nd that prime-aged men living in pension households are
￿ve percentage points less likely to be employed, and that this e⁄ect is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero.
Our speci￿cation in row 1 di⁄ers from that reported in Bertrand et al. in ways that could
a⁄ect our results, but in practice do not.1 However, when we estimate equation (1), restricting
our sample to three-generation households, and using the same education variable and number of
resident members variables used by Bertrand et al, our results do not change in any meaningful
way.
Posel et al. focus on the fact that restricting analysis to resident household members will miss an
important group of working household members: labor migrants. Following Bertrand et al. (in order
to make their results as comparable as possible) Posel et al. use data from the Project for Statistics
on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD). The PSLSD only recorded whether there were
household members who were migrants, and why they were absent (working, looking for work, etc.)
but otherwise collected no information on the hours worked or earnings of the migrants. Perhaps for
this reason, Posel et al. do not show how the probability of employment for all prime-aged adults
(resident and non-resident alike) corresponds to the presence of a pensioner in the household. We
provide this information for our sample in row 2 of Table 2. Once non-resident prime-aged members
are added to our analysis, we ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant association between the presence of a
pensioner and the probability of employment for men and women examined separately (columns 2
and 3) or jointly (column 1). The results for men are particularly interesting: including non-resident
members, the coe¢ cient on the presence of a pensioner falls from ￿ 0.05 to ￿ 0.01, and is no longer
1Bertrand et al. control for education by including an indicator variable that an individual has completed at least
grade 8. In addition, these authors control for the number of resident members, and the number of members who are
ages 0 to 24, using several categories between 16 and 24. They also include 16 and 17 year olds in their analysis of
employment. Bertrand et al restrict their sample to households that have at least three-generations (grandparents,
parents and children), in order to reduce the heterogeneity of their sample. We prefer to include all households ￿
primarily because the middle generation is the most likely to have migrated for work (as seen in Figure 1) and the
absence of a middle-generation adult might drop the household, if we were to restrict our sample to three generations.
We exclude 16 and 17 year olds, because the probability that they are employed is very close to zero.
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That the presence of a pensioner is signi￿cantly associated with labor migrant status for
both men and women can be seen in row 3 of Table 2. Prime-aged women in pension households
are 5 percentage points more likely to be labor migrants than are other women, holding constant
age, education and household composition, and prime-aged men are 3 percentage points more
likely. Evidence in Table 2 is consistent with a model in which the presence of a pensioner allows
prime-aged adults a greater opportunity to leave for work elsewhere.
4 Panel estimates of the impact of pension receipt on em-
ployment and migration
Data collected in ACDIS allow us to examine the timing of pension arrival, pension withdrawal, and
changes in employment and migration. In this section, we present estimates based on longitudinal
analyses of these data.
With data available from two rounds of the socioeconomic survey, we can modify equation
(1) to allow for individual ￿xed e⁄ects. That is, the unobservable component of (1) can be written
,,
o oo
iht i iht u o em ea = +=
(2)
where ao
i is an individual-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect for labor market outcome o:This e⁄ect will absorb
all determinants of employment (ae
i) or migration (am
i ) that are constant within person i over
time. This includes, inter alia, unobserved ability and characteristics of the household in which an
individual was raised, together with his or her sex, year of birth, and (generally) years of completed
schooling. A straightforward way to estimate the ￿xed e⁄ects model, given we have two observations
per person, is to run changes in labor market outcomes on changes in household￿ s pension status
and changes in characteristics that may change through time:
,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ( ) ( ) ()
ht
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(3)
Table 3 presents estimates of ￿ from equation (3) for employment outcomes for prime-aged
members, from regressions that also control for change in the number of resident household members
and the time in days between the household￿ s survey date at HSE1 and its survey date at HSE2. The
￿rst column of Table 3 restricts the sample to prime-aged household members who were resident
at both HSE1 and HSE2. With this restriction, results in column 1 can be interpreted as the ￿rst-
di⁄erence analog to those presented by Bertrand et al. We ￿nd no signi￿cant association between
change in household pension status and change in employment for members who were resident in
both periods.
This result stands in contrast to the earlier cross-sectional results of Bertrand et al., and our
results in Table 2. All of the earlier cross-sectional results may su⁄er from omitted variable bias:
the presence of a pensioner in the household may be correlated with unobservable characteristics
of the household and its members that also determine employment (Hosegood and Tim￿us 2005b).
This explanation is consistent with additional evidence from ACDIS that pension households attract
new resident members who are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from new members of non-pension households.
Speci￿cally, prime-aged individuals who became resident members of pension households between
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new resident members of non-pension households. This di⁄erence in employment was statistically
signi￿cant, with or without controls for the new members￿sex, age and education. (This is a pattern
documented throughout South Africa by Klasen and Woolard 2000, who ￿nd the location decisions
of the unemployed are strongly in￿ uenced by the availability of economic support, often in the form
of the social pension.)
It does not appear that the arrival of the pension caused these new members to stop working.
Nearly 60 percent of these new unemployed members in pension households reported that they had
never worked before, and almost 90 percent reported that they had not worked in the last year.
Instead, it appears that pension households are signi￿cantly more likely to attract non-working
resident members.
The remainder of Table 3 presents evidence of the impact of change in pension status on the
employment of all members￿ resident and non-resident alike. Opening our analysis to all prime-
aged members, we ￿nd a small, positive and signi￿cant relationship between pension receipt and
employment for both men and women. A change in pension status is associated with a 3 percentage
point change in employment status, on average.
With ￿xed e⁄ect estimation, the only individuals who contribute information for the es-
timate of ￿ are those that either gained a pension between the survey rounds, or lost a pension
between the rounds. (The e⁄ects for individuals who were always living with a pensioner or who
never lived with a pensioner are absorbed in those individuals￿￿xed e⁄ects.) Estimates in row 1 of
Table 3 treat pension gain and pension loss symmetrically. That is, the employment e⁄ect of gain-
ing the pension between rounds of the survey is assumed to be equal and opposite to that of losing
the pension between rounds. We can test whether the data support this by replacing our change in
pension status variable by two variables ￿one that indicates that the individual￿ s household gained
pension status, and one that indicates the household lost pension status.
Results from this estimation are presented in the lower panel of Table 3. We ￿nd, for both
men and women, that the loss of a pension between rounds of the survey is associated with a lower
probability of working, and the gain of a pension with a higher probability of working. Moreover,
we cannot reject that these coe¢ cients are equal and opposite in sign. The standard errors on the
pension loss and gain indicator variables are quite large, however, and the estimates for pension
gain are not statistically signi￿cant for men and women estimated jointly, or for women estimated
alone. Overall, the results in Table 3 provide modest support for a positive impact of pension
receipt on prime-aged adults￿employment. They provide no evidence to support claims that the
arrival of the pension has a negative causal e⁄ect on work.
Estimates of the impact of change in pension status on labor migration are provided in Table
4. Both the arrival and withdrawal of an old-age pension are signi￿cantly associated with change
in migrant worker status, for both men and women. On average, individuals from households that
lost pension status were 4 to 6 percentage points less likely to become or remain working migrants
between HSE1 and HSE2. Individuals from households that gained pension status between HSE1
and HSE2 were 4 to 5 percentage points more likely to become or remain migrants.
A change in pension status could have di⁄erent e⁄ects on current labor migrants and house-
hold members who could, potentially, become migrants. We examine whether this is the case in the
last two panels of Table 4. In the third panel, we restrict our analysis to individuals who were labor
migrants at the time of the ￿rst household socioeconomic survey (HSE1), and in the last panel, we
restrict our analysis to individuals who were not labor migrants at HSE1. Dividing migrants and
potential migrants highlights the fact that, on average, pension gain has a larger impact on potential
8migrants. Although for current migrants pension gain takes a positive coe¢ cient￿ associated with
maintaining migrant status￿ and pension loss a negative coe¢ cient associated with losing migrant
status, the estimated coe¢ cients are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. In contrast, for potential
migrants, we ￿nd prime aged adults in households that lost pension status are 4 percentage points
less likely to become migrants between waves, while those in households that gained pension status
are 7 percentage points more likely to become migrants.
In summary, we ￿nd that prime-aged household members are signi￿cantly more likely to
be employed following pension gain, and that this e⁄ect works through the increased probability
that prime aged members become labor migrants upon pension receipt. We also ￿nd an asymmetry
with respect to the pension￿ s e⁄ect on labor migrants and non-migrants, with the change in pension
status having a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the behavior of potential migrants, but not on those who were
already working and not resident at HSE1. In the next section, we present a model of migration
decision-making which we use to interpret these results.
5 A model of migration decision-making
The decision of whether a prime-aged man or woman will migrate for employment is likely to
be determined jointly by potential migrants and members of their households who might support
them, or who might rely on them for support. Migration decisions will depend on employment
opportunities and wages inside and outside the DSA, costs associated with moving and being away,
the household￿ s need for caregivers, and household credit constraints.
We initially present a model in which women￿ s and men￿ s roles in the household and labor
market opportunities are the same. We will return to potential di⁄erences between their circum-
stances once we have a model in place. Initially, we assume that households pool resources and
make decisions jointly. (This will also be relaxed below.) We assume that individuals face credit
constraints, and cannot borrow against future earnings. For notational purposes, we refer to the
DSA as the rural sector r and the destination of migrants as the urban sector u.
We assume that a person working in the DSA earns a wage wr: Given the limited work oppor-
tunities available in the DSA, we assume that the wages o⁄ered there are unchanging through time,
but pay well enough to meet individuals￿minimum living expenses for necessities zr (clothing, food
and shelter)
wr = ￿ wr = zr￿
If an individual migrates to ￿nd work, he or she receives initial wage o⁄ers of wu0: Through the
wage growth that comes with experience, or through job search once in the urban sector, wages in
the urban sector rise with the time migrants spend there. The growth path of urban wages wut can
be characterized as
wut = wu0egt + "t;
where t is the time since arrival there, g is the growth rate of wages in the sector, and " is the
idiosyncratic component to wages at time t:
We assume that initial urban sector wages do not cover the costs of migrating to the urban
sector and expenses associated with living there, so that
wu0 < zu;
9where zu includes both living expenses and costs associated with migrating. In order to survive in
the urban sector, recent migrants need to rely on ￿nancial help from members of their households in
the DSA, who transfer enough resources to ensure that expenses are met. We assume that simply
meeting living expenses results in an equally low-level of utility in the urban and rural sectors. With
time, labor migrants￿wages grow to the point that, on average, labor migrants are self-supporting.
When wages exceed living expenses in the urban sector, utility is higher for labor migrants than
non-migrants (whose wages are stagnant at zr). At this point, labor migrants may also begin to
send remittances, increasing the utility of household members in the DSA.2
For households to be able to send and support migrants for some period of time, two
conditions must hold. First, total household income Y H must exceed that necessary to meet
resident members￿basic needs by more than the migrant￿ s income shortfall. In any period t;in a
household with Nt resident members, household resources are su¢ cient to sustain a labor migrant
if
Y H
t ￿ Ntzr > zu ￿ wut￿
This is the household￿ s ￿nancial constraint F:
Financial Constraint : F = 1 if Y H
t ￿ Ntzr > zu ￿ wut (4)
= 0 otherwise
Each period following migration this condition is, on average, easier to meet, given expected
growth in urban sector wages.In addition, the household must ensure that children in the DSA
household are being cared for. If the household has resident children (this could be the number of
children aged 0 to 5, or 0 to 7, for example) residing in the DSA household who are in need of care,
the condition that must be met in order to send an adult labor migrant is
[1 ￿ I (Rt = 1)]Nct = 0
where I (Rt = 1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if there is at least one resident
adult who could care for children in the DSA in period t:This condition will hold either if there are
no children in need of care [Nct = 0];or if there is an adult in the DSA who could care for young
children [1 ￿ I (Rt = 1) = 0]: This is the household￿ s childcare constraint C.
Childcare constraint : C = 1 if [1 ￿ I (Rt = 1)]Nct = 0 (5)
= 0 otherwise
The household￿ s childcare constraint may be met, for example, if all children in need of care
were able to migrate with the prime-aged adult who is considering migrating￿ so that Nc = 0 .
Equations (4) and (5) are necessary, but not su¢ cient, conditions for households to send
a labor migrant. Equation (4) may hold, but if household members do not pool income, potential
migrants may not be guaranteed the support they need from their households to sustain themselves
in the urban sector until they ￿nd their feet. Equation (5) may hold, but if adults in the DSA
2We do not have data on remittances, and so we do not explicitly model remittances here. However, adding
remittances to the model would, in general, strengthen the household￿ s incentives to send migrants. For the large
role played by remittances in rural households in KwaZulu-Natal, see Posel 2001.
10household who could mind children do not agree to do so, the household￿ s childcare needs may not
be met. In what follows, these conditions help us to better understand the barriers that exist for
labor migration and how those barriers change with the presence and withdrawal of pensioners.
The gain or loss of a resident pensioner in the migrant￿ s DSA household may a⁄ect the
probability that equations (4) and (5) are met and, in this way, a⁄ect the probability that a labor
migrant is sent to the urban sector, stays in the sector, or returns to the DSA. Pension income
generally increases Y H, which increases the odds that the DSA household has funds to support
a labor migrant until he or she becomes self-supporting. In addition, the presence of a pensioner
increases the odds that there is an adult present in the DSA who could care for children.
The probability of being a labor migrant (mig) can be written
Pr(mig) = Pr(C = 1;F = 1)
We can write the joint probability as the product of the probability of meeting the childcare con-
straint, conditional on the probability of meeting the ￿nancial constraint multiplied by the marginal
probability of meeting the ￿nancial constraint:
Pr(mig) = Pr(C = 1;F = 1) = Pr(C = 1 j F = 1)Pr(F = 1)
We can then express the change in the probability of being a labor migrant, given change in
household pension status (pen status)as
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 | 1 Pr 1 Pr 1 | 1 Pr
Pr | Pr / Pr
1 1 1 1
1 2
= = D + = = = D
» D ” -
= = = =
= =
t t t t
t t
F C F F C
mig penstatus mig penstatus mig
(6)
The ￿rst term on the right hand side of (6) quanti￿es the extent to which change in pension
status changes the conditional probability of meeting the childcare constraint, multiplied by the
probability that the ￿nancial constraint has been met, and the second term quanti￿es the change
in probability that the ￿nancial constraint is met, given the change in pension status, multiplied
by the probability that the childcare constraint has been met. The average sizes of these two terms
in (6) will vary, depending on whether individuals are labor migrants at HSE1.
5.1 Labor migrants
Labor migrants at HSE1 are meeting their ￿nancial and childcare constraints. We would not have
observed them as labor migrants at HSE1 otherwise. For these individuals, then, Pr(Ft=1 = 1) =
Pr(Ct=1 = 1 j Ft=1 = 1) = 1: This simpli￿es the equation quantifying the change in the probability
of remaining a labor migrant, for those who lost pension status between waves of the survey, to
the sum of the change in the conditional probability that the childcare constraint is being met plus
the change in the probability that the ￿nancial constraint is being met. For current labor migrants
facing pension loss:
( )
( ) ( ) 0 , 1 | 1 Pr 0 , 1 , 1 | 1 Pr
/ Pr
2 1 2 1 = = = D + = = = = D
»
= = = = t t t t pen pen F pen pen F C
penloss mig
11For current labor migrants, the change in the probability of meeting the ￿nancial constraint
upon pension loss may be small, if the migrant has experienced wage growth in the urban sector.
In the limit, this change will be zero￿ once the migrant is self-supporting. However, even self-
supporting migrants may ￿nd that pension loss brings them back to the DSA, through the e⁄ect
pension loss may have on the probability of meeting childcare constraints.
Labor migrants from households that gain pension status between waves of the survey
should experience no change in the probability that they remain labor migrants. These migrants
had already been meeting the constraints necessary for migration ￿that is, equations (4) and (5)
already held. For these migrants, the arrival of the pension changes neither the probability that
the ￿nancial constraint is met, nor the probability that the childcare constraint is met. In terms
of equation (6), this implies ￿Pr(C = 1 j F = 1) = ￿Pr(F = 1) = 0: The arrival of the pension
simply reinforces a migrant￿ s ability to meet these constraints.
5.2 Potential labor migrants
In contrast, prime-aged household members who were not labor migrants at HSE1 may face binding
￿nancial constraints, or childcare constraints, or potentially both, which may be responsible for
their status as potential labor migrants. In equation (6), there is a chance that one of the necessary
conditions for supporting a labor migrant is not met: that is, Pr(Ft=1 = 1) or Pr(Ct=1 j F = 1),
or both may be strictly less than 1. This provides an additional reason why the impact of pension
gain and loss on potential labor migrants may be di⁄erent from that observed for current labor
migrants.
Among prime aged adults who were not labor migrants at HSE1, pension loss should reduce
the probability of labor migration: subsequent to the loss of a pensioner, (4) and (5) are less likely
to be met. Pension gain should increase the probability of labor migration, as (4) and (5) are more
likely to hold.
5.3 Predictions of the impact of pension loss and gain
The model holds predictions for patterns we should observe in our data. For labor migrants at
HSE1, the change in the probability of remaining a labor migrant for individuals from households
that gained pension status between rounds of the survey should be equal to zero. Table 4 shows
that this is born out in our data (￿ = 0:021for this group, and is not di⁄erent from zero).
For non-migrants at HSE1, changes in the probability of meeting constraints (4) and (5) are
symmetric with respect to pension gain and loss. As a result we would expect the e⁄ect of gaining
pension status between the rounds to be equal and opposite to the e⁄ect of losing pension status,
all else held equal for this group. Table 4 suggests that this is also the case. In results for both men
and women, we cannot reject at a ￿ve percent level that the e⁄ects are equal and opposite.
The model suggests additional tests of the ACDIS data. If there are no children in need of care
in the DSA, then ￿Pr(C = 1 j F = 1) = 0 and Pr(Ct=1 = 1) = 1, and the change in the probability
of sending or remaining a labor migrant upon the loss of pension status simpli￿es, for both current
and potential labor migrants, to
￿Pr(mig j penloss) ￿ ￿Pr(F = 1 j pent=1 = 1;pent=2 = 0) (7)
As discussed above, we would expect this e⁄ect to be larger for potential migrants than for
current migrants, if there are ￿xed costs to be paid in order to migrate (which the current labor
12migrants have already paid), and/or if there is wage growth over time in the urban sector.
We present tests of this in Table 5, where we add an interaction term between pension loss
and an indicator that the household had any resident children aged 0 to 5 at HSE1, and a similar
interaction term for pension gain. The interaction terms absorb the childcare e⁄ects, while the
pension loss and gain indicators standing alone absorb the ￿nancial constraint e⁄ects.
Beginning with the latter, we ￿nd, for households without young children (so that the interaction
term is zero), that current labor migrants who lose pension status are not signi￿cantly more likely
to lose labor migrant status between HSE1 and HSE2 than are other labor migrants. Indeed, the
point-estimate on the pension loss variable is positive (0.042), but is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. In contrast, potential labor migrants at HSE1 that lost pension status in households without
small children are 4.2 percentage points less likely to be observed as labor migrants at HSE2 than
are other potential labor migrants. This di⁄erence in the impact of pension loss between current
and potential labor migrants is consistent with an asymmetry in the change in the probability that
current and potential labor migrants meet their ￿nancial constraints when the pension is lost.
Among current labor migrants, we ￿nd that the presence of young children in the DSA reduces
the probability that the migrant is able to maintain his or her labor migrant status upon the loss of
pension status. Relative to other labor migrants, these individuals are 14 percentage points more
likely to lose their labor migrant status upon pension loss, suggesting that the childcare constraint
binds for some fraction of these labor migrants, even if the ￿nancial constraint is met. These e⁄ects
are equally large for male and female labor migrants: in results estimated but not shown, the
coe¢ cient for women, estimated separately, is ￿ 0.145, and for men is ￿ 0.122.
Among potential labor migrants, we ￿nd that while the loss of pension status reduces the
probability of being observed as a labor migrant at HSE2, the presence of small children does not
interact signi￿cantly with pension loss. For these prime-aged household members, the childcare or
￿nancial constraint may already bind. To the extent that these individuals were not labor migrants
because they could not meet their childcare constraint, the loss of the pension has an insigni￿cant
additional impact on the probability of meeting this constraint. The presence of the pensioner
wasn￿ t allowing the potential migrant to meet the childcare constraint, and the withdrawal of the
pensioner doesn￿ t change that.
Table 5 also supports the hypothesis that current labor migrants are insensitive to pension gain,
while potential migrants are highly sensitive to the arrival of a pension. The F-test of the joint
signi￿cance of pension gain variables for current migrants is small and insigni￿cant (F=0.41, p-
value=0.66), while the F-test of pension gain variables for potential migrants is large (F=19.51,
p-value=0.00).
For potential migrants, we ￿nd signi￿cantly di⁄erent e⁄ects of pension gain on labor migration
for men and women. Pension arrival leads to an 11 percentage point increase in labor migration for
women, which is signi￿cantly larger than the 3 percentage point increase observed for men. However,
women in households with small children are observed with a slightly smaller (7 percentage point)
increase, relative to other women ￿a di⁄erence not observed for men.
The model also suggests that labor migrants should be more likely to maintain their status
upon pension loss, the wealthier is their household in the DSA. Table 6 provides a test of household
￿nancial constraints by adding interaction terms to the labor migration regressions presented in
Table 4. Table 6 presents the results of regressions in which indicators that the household gained
or lost a pension are interacted with markers that the household is of relatively high socioeconomic
status (SES). We add these interaction terms in order to test whether households of greater means
are less sensitive to the gain or loss of a pensioner, when making decisions on migration, than
13are other households. Greater household resources should increase the probability of meeting the
￿nancial constraint posed in equation (4).
We use, as our measure of household SES, an indicator that at least one prime-aged member
had a high school degree interacted with an indicator that the household owned more than 5 assets
at HSE1. Using this de￿nition, 30 percent of our prime-aged individuals are categorized as being
from a high SES household. The main e⁄ect of our SES measure will be absorbed in the individuals￿
￿xed e⁄ects. Our interest is in the interaction terms of SES and pension loss, and SES and pension
gain.
For current labor migrants, we ￿nd that having come from a household of higher SES protects
labor migration status upon the loss of a pension. For labor migrants at HSE1, those who came from
lower SES households and lost pension status were 9 percentage points less likely to remain labor
migrants than were other labor migrants. However, labor migrants from higher SES households who
lost pension status face no greater risk of losing their labor migrant status than do any other labor
migrants. The e⁄ect for migrants from high SES households that lost pension status is small (-
0.092+0.113=0.021), and not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Consistent with the model developed
above, we ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ects of a household gaining pension status on the probability of a
labor migrant maintaining his or her migrant status.
We can also use ACDIS data to explore whether labor migrants with better jobs are signi￿cantly
more likely to continue to meet their ￿nancial constraint upon pension loss. Once labor migrants are
self-supporting, equation (4) becomes irrelevant for their migration decisions. For this reason, we
might expect the loss of a pensioner to have a more muted e⁄ect on migration decisions for migrants
with better jobs. We do not have information on how much labor migrants earn. However, we do
know the migrant￿ s occupation and education. If people in higher status occupations have higher
urban wages, wut;then equation (4) is more likely to hold for this set of migrants. In results estimated
but not shown, we interacted pension loss with being in a low-status occupation (domestic work or
unskilled work), and separately interact pension loss with the migrant￿ s own education. We ￿nd
that individuals in lower-status occupations are 14 percentage points more likely to lose their labor
migrant status upon the loss of a pension than are labor migrants in higher status occupations,
holding constant education and household SES.
In summary, we ￿nd evidence of ￿nancial constraints and childcare constraints limiting labor
migration. Both pension status￿ relaxing the ￿nancial constraint￿ and the presence of pensioners￿
relaxing the childcare constraint￿ a⁄ect the ability of households to send and maintain labor mi-
grants.
6 Are All Pensioners Created Equal?
Almost 80 percent of cases in which pension status is lost occur because a pensioner dies. An
alternative explanation for the impact of pension loss on labor migration status is that the death
of a pensioner induces migrants to return home.
We investigate whether death is the driving force in pension loss, by examining separately
the three main reasons ways in which a pensioner leaves a household in the DSA. In 77% of cases, it
is because a pensioner dies. In 11 percent of cases, it is because the pensioner has left the household
and the DSA, and in 9 percent of the cases it is because the pensioner has left the household, but
continues to reside in the DSA. Together these account for 97 percent of cases in which pension
status was lost. Table 7 restricts attention to these three types of pension loss, and presents
results on the impact of change in pension status by category on change in prime-aged adult labor
14migration. For both women and men, we ￿nd that pension loss through death of the pensioner,
and pension loss through the pensioner leaving the surveillance site, have the same negative and
signi￿cant e⁄ect on labor migration status. Both lead to a reduction in the probability of labor
migration at HSE2 of 6 percentage points. In results run, but not shown, we ￿nd this to be true
for current labor migrants estimated separately (F-tests for these are presented in panel 2), and for
potential labor migrants (panel 3).
The fact that the death of a pensioner is statistically indistinguishable from that of the
out-migration of the pensioner suggest that the results we have found are not due to a death, but
due instead to the absence of a pensioner and his or her pension. That said, it does not help us
to distinguish between the physical presence of a pensioner and that of the pension. It is possible
that a pensioner still in the DSA (but no longer resident in the household) could care for children
and could continue to contribute to the support of labor migrants.
6.1 Relatedness
We can also examine whether the degree of relatedness between pension recipients and prime-aged
household members a⁄ects prime-aged members￿labor migrant status, as suggested by kin-altruism
models. Bowles and Posel (2005), for example, ￿nd relatedness to be a signi￿cant predictor of mi-
grant remittances in South Africa. Although we do not have data on remittances, and have limited
information on the degree of relatedness between household members, we can identify whether pen-
sion recipients are the father or mother of prime-aged household members. Of the 1364 prime-aged
members whose households gained pension status between HSE1 and HSE2, two-thirds (939) were
a son or daughter of the household member who became a pensioner.
We can test whether pension gain di⁄erentially a⁄ects the children of pensioners, relative to other
prime-aged adults in the household, by adding interaction terms to our labor migrant regressions.
Speci￿cally, we add interaction terms for pension loss and gain interacted with an indicator that
the pensioner is the prime-aged member￿ s parent. We ￿nd, for both men and women, that pension
gain has a larger and more signi￿cant e⁄ect on the probability of potential migrants becoming
labor migrants when the person newly receiving the pension is a parent. Relative to other types
of members, when parents become pensioners this leads to a 7 percentage point increase in the
probability of becoming a labor migrant. (Results available upon request.)
We found no additional e⁄ects of pension loss or gain by a parent on the behavior of those
adults who were labor migrants at HSE1. However, given the asymmetries between potential and
current migrants discussed above, we would not expect to ￿nd e⁄ects here. Even if parents are
more important than other household members in staking current migrants until these migrants
become established, once the migrants are self-supporting, the loss of a parent pensioner may have
little ￿nancial e⁄ect on this group.3
6.2 Male and female pensioners: who pools?
We can also use the ACDIS data to examine whether male and female pensioners are equally likely
to stake migrants. Related work has suggested that pension money in the hands of women may
have a greater impact on household outcomes than pension money in the hands of men (Posel et
3It is possible that as parents and other older adults in the household become frail, labor migrants might be called
back to the DSA to care for them. However, we ￿nd no evidence for this in our data. In pension households, both
male and female prime-aged members were signi￿cantly more likely to be labor migrants at HSE2 the older were the
pensioners in their households. (Results available upon request.)
15al., Du￿ o 2003). Table 8 presents evidence on the di⁄erence between female and male pensioners.
For both prime-aged men and women, the loss of a female pensioner has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect
on the probability of becoming a labor migrant between waves of the survey, while the loss of a
male pensioner has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on either. The gain of a female pensioner between waves
is associated with greater labor migration for both men and women. However, labor migration for
men is also closely linked with the receipt of pension income for an older male in the household.
We have tested whether the di⁄erential e⁄ect of male pensioners on the labor migrations status of
potential migrants is due to the fact that, upon male pension gain, households are signi￿cantly more
likely to also house a female pensioner. We ￿nd no evidence for this explanation for the di⁄erence
in the impact of male and female pensioners. It appears that the presence of a woman pensioner
promotes labor migration for both men and women, consistent with female pensioners pooling their
income with prime-aged members of both sexes, and that the presence of a male pensioner promotes
labor migration, but for prime-aged men only.
7 Conclusion
Much of the discussion on the behavioral changes induced by government cash transfers centers
on the e⁄ects such transfers may have on both the recipients of these transfers and the household
members who live with them. (Excellent reviews of the literature are provided by Atkinson and
Micklewright 1991, and Mo¢ tt 1992.) Our results suggest some refocus is warranted. Large cash
transfers to elderly South Africans lead to increased labor migration among prime-aged members.
The pension￿ s impact appears to work both through the e⁄ects it has on household resources and
on the presence in the DSA of an adult who can care for small children.
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Table 1. Household and individual  characteristics in the Africa Centre DSA  
 
  Never had a 
pension 
 
Always had a 
pension 
Lost pension 
status from  
HSE1 to HSE2 
Gained pension 
status from  




Number of households  5625  2661  342  465 
Number of members  7.48   9.93*  8.80*  9.28* 
Number of resident 
members 
5.34 6.94* 5.57  6.61* 
Residents aged 0 to 5  0.78  0.92*  0.87  0.98* 
Residents aged 6 to 17  2.09  2.44*  2.13  2.28* 
Residents aged 18 to 50  2.12  2.20*  2.27  2.01 
Residents aged 51 +  0.36  1.37*  0.30   1.33* 
Number of labor migrants  0.77  1.14*  0.92*  1.15* 




Number of individuals  14397  8466  1044  1364 
Female              0.55  0.51*  0.51*  0.50* 
Years of education  8.54  8.57  8.59  9.10* 
Employed 0.48  0.45*  0.42*  0.47   
Labor migrant   0.23  0.31*  0.25  0.33* 
Resident in the DSA  0.59  0.49*  0.53*  0.46* 
 
Notes. Column 1 reports means for households that did not have a resident member 
age-eligible for the social pension at either wave of the household socioeconomic 
status module (HSE1 or HSE2). Column 2 reports on households that had an age-
eligible member at both waves. Column 3 reports on households that had an age-
eligible member at HSE1, but not at HSE2. Column 4 reports on households that did 
not have an age-eligible member at HSE1 but did at HSE2. Of those households that 
gained a pension between the waves, 80 percent had a resident member who aged into 
pension age between rounds of the survey. Labor migrants are household members 
reported to be working and non-resident in the DSA. Asterisks (*) denote that the 
differences between households or individuals that never had a pension and other 
types of households are significant at the 5 percent level.  
18Table 2. Employment, migration and the presence of a pensioner at HSE2 
 
  Women and 
men 
Women only  Men only 
Dependent variable:  
Employment at HSE2 






 n=21103  n=12314  n=8789 








 n=35842  n=19103  n=16739 
Dependent variable: 
Labor migrant at HSE2 
   








 n=35842  n=19103  n=16739 
 
Notes. Table 2 reports the coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions of 
employment (rows 1 and 2) and labor migration(row 3) on an indicator that a 
household has a resident member of pension age. Also included in each regression are 
the number of resident members ages 0 to 5, 6 to 17, 18 to 50, and aged 51 and above, 
a complete set of indicators for the member’s years of completed schooling, and a 
quartic in the member’s age. Unobservables are clustered at the household level. The 
sample is restricted to household members greater than age 17 and less than age 51 at 






          
19Table 3. The effect of change in pension status on employment 
 
      Dependent  variable:   
Change in employment status  
HSE2 – HSE1 













Change in household pension 









Indicator: Household lost 









Indicator: Household gained 









Number of observations  12222  24921    13183  11738 
 
Notes. Table 3 reports the coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions of 
change in employment status (HSE2–HSE1) on change in the presence of a resident 
member age-eligible for the pension (HSE2–HSE1). Also included in each regression 
are the change in the number of resident members, and the number of days that 
elapsed between HSE1 and HSE2. The sample is restricted to household members 
greater than age 17 at HSE1 and less than age 51 at HSE2. The sample in column 1 is 
restricted to members who were resident at both HSE1 and HSE2. 
20Table 4. The effect of change in pension status on migration for work 
  
    Dependent variable:  
Change in labor migrant status HSE2 – HSE1 
 All  members  Women  Men 
Change in household pension 







Number of observations  24921  13183  11738 
Indicator: Household lost 







Indicator: Household gained 







Number of observations  24921  13183  11738 
  Change in labor migrant status for those who were 
labor migrants at HSE1 
Indicator: Household lost 







Indicator: Household gained 







Number of observations  5283    2033  3250 
  Change in labor migrant status for those who were 
not labor migrants at HSE1 
Indicator: Household lost 
pension status HSE2 – HSE1 
–0.038 
(0.013) 




Indicator: Household gained 
pension status HSE2 – HSE1 
0.070 
(0.011) 




Number of observations  19638    11150  8488 
 
Notes. Table 4 reports the coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions of 
change in labor migrant status (HSE2–HSE1) on change in the presence of a resident 
member age-eligible for the pension (HSE2–HSE1). Also included in each regression 
are the change in the number of resident members, and the number of days that 
elapsed between HSE1 and HSE2. The sample is restricted to household members 
greater than age 17 at HSE1 and less than age 51 at HSE2.  
21Table 5. Pension status and the impact of small children on labor migration 
  






Not labor migrants at HSE1 
      All   All  Women  Men 
Household lost pension status  









Household lost pension status  × 









Household gained pension status  









Household gained pension status  × 

























Number of observations  5283    19638  11150  8488 
 
Notes. Table 5 reports the coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions of 
change in labor migrant status (HSE2–HSE1) on change in the presence of a resident 
member age-eligible for the pension (HSE2–HSE1). Also included in each regression 
are the change in the number of resident members, and the number of days that 
elapsed between HSE1 and HSE2. The sample is restricted to household members 
greater than age 17 at HSE1 and less than age 51 at HSE2.  
22Table 6. Household socioeconomic status, pension status and migration 
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Household gained pension status 





Household gained pension status 





F-test: joint significance of 
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Number of observations  5231  19417 
 
Notes. Table 6 reports the coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions of 
change in labor migrant status (HSE2–HSE1) on change in the presence of a resident 
member age-eligible for the pension (HSE2–HSE1). Also included in each regression 
are the change in the number of resident members, and the number of days that 
elapsed between HSE1 and HSE2. The sample is restricted to household members 
greater than age 17 at HSE1 and less than age 51 at HSE2.  
23Table 7. Change in labor migration status by type of pension loss 
  
    Dependent variable:  
Change in labor migrant status HSE2 – HSE1 
  All 
members 
 Women  Men 








Pension loss through external 
individual out migration of pensioner 
–0.061 
(0.039) 




Pension loss through internal 
individual migration of pensioner 
0.068 
(0.042) 




Pension gain  0.045 
(0.112) 












Number of observations  24873    13162  11711 
  Change in labor migrant status for those who 
were labor migrants at HSE1 








Number of observations  5275    2031  3244 
  Change in labor migrant status for those who 
were not labor migrants at HSE1 








Number of observations  19598    11131  8467 
 
Notes. Table 7 reports the coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions of 
change in labor migrant status (HSE2–HSE1) on change in the presence of a resident 
member age-eligible for the pension (HSE2–HSE1). Also included in each regression 
are the change in the number of resident members, and the number of days that 
elapsed between HSE1 and HSE2. The sample is restricted to household members 
greater than age 17 at HSE1 and less than age 51 at HSE2. 
24Table 8. The impact of a gain or loss of male and female pensioners on labor 
migration 
    Labor  migrants  at 
HSE1 
  Not labor migrants 
at HSE1 
 Women  Men    Women  Men 
Household lost female pensioner  









Household lost male pensioner  









Household gained female pensioner  









Household gained male pensioner  









Number of observations  2035  3250    11148  8489 
 
Notes. Table 8 reports the coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions of 
change in the labor migration status. Also included in each regression are variables for 
the change in the number of resident members, and the number of days that elapsed 
between HSE1 and HSE2. The sample is restricted to household members greater 
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Employment, Migration and Education - Women 18 to 50
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